Freedom of Business: An Essay in Political Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2020, under contract).

Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis: Why Incompetence is Worse than Greed (Cambridge University Press, 2015 hb, 2017 pb).

Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010).

New Waves in Political Philosophy, eds. with Christopher F. Zurn (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009).

Vice Epistemology and Economics, in Joakim Sandberg & Lisa Warenski (eds.), The Philosophy of Money and Finance (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2021).

Finance and Financial Economics: A Philosophy of Science Perspective (with Melissa Vergara Fernández), in Conrad Heilmann & Julian Reiss (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics (Routledge, forthcoming 2021).

Real Life Collective Epistemic Virtue and Vice (with Barend de Rooij), in Mark Alfano, Colin Klein & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology (Routledge, forthcoming 2021)

Knowledge Attribution, Socioeconomic Status, and Education: New Results Using the Great British Class Survey, Synthese, Accepted 16 November 2020.

Saving the Armchair by Experiment: What Works in Economics doesn’t Work in Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Published online 7 October 2020.

Epistemic Corporate Culture: Knowledge, Common Knowledge, and Professional Oaths, Seattle University Law Review, 43 (2020): 807–839.

Epistemic Injustice in Finance, Topoi, Published online 4 October 2019.

Stakes Sensitivity and Credit Rating: A New Challenge for Regulators (with Anthony Booth), Journal of Business Ethics, Published online 17 September 2019.

Impermissible Self-rationalizing Pessimism: In Defence of a Pragmatic Ethics of Belief (with Nikolaj Nottelmann), Erkenntnis, accepted 8 January 2019.

Freedom in Finance: The Importance of Epistemic Virtues and Interlucent Communication (with Richard Endörfer), in Christopher Cowton, James Demsey & Tom Sorell (eds.), Business Ethics after the Global Financial Crisis: Lessons from the Crash (New York: Routledge, 2019), 104–130.

Philosophy of Money and Finance (with Lisa Herzog, Martin O’Neill & Joakim Sandberg) in Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford: Stanford University, 2018).

Le « cloud » : éthique du nuage informatique (translation of ‘The Ethics of Cloud Computing’, with Luciano Floridi), in Milad Doueihi & Jacopo Domenicucci (eds.), La confiance à l’ère numérique (Paris: Éditions Rue d’Ulm, 2018)

Moral Responsibility for Large-Scale Events: The Difference between Climate Change and Economic Crises, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 42/1 (2018): 191–212.

The Ethics of Cloud Computing (with Luciano Floridi), Science and Engineering Ethics, 23/1 (2017): 21–39.

Information as a Condition of Justice in Financial Markets: The Regulation of Credit-Rating Agencies, in Lisa Herzog (ed.), Just Financial Markets? Finance in a Just Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 250–270.

Professional oath in Deborah Poff & Alex Michalos (eds.), Encyclopedia of Business and Professional Ethics (Cham: Springer, 2017).

Research Habits in Financial Modelling: The Case of Non-normativity of Market Returns in the 1970s and the 1980s (with Christian Walter), in Emiliano Ippoliti and Ping Chen (eds.), Methods and Finance: A Unifying View on Finance, Mathematics, and Philosophy (Cham: Springer, 2017).

Pledging Integrity: Oaths as Forms of Business Management, Journal of Business Ethics, 136/1 (2016): 23–42.

Ethics Management in Banking and Finance, in Nick Morris and David Vines (eds.), Capital Failure: Rebuilding Trust in Financial Services (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 255–276.

Professional Oaths in the Financial Services Industry, in Bob Chandler (ed.), Business and Corporate Integrity: Sustaining Organizational Ethics, Compliance and Trust (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2014), 121–140.

Alcohol in the Media and Young People: What Do We Need for Liberal Policy-making?, Public Health Ethics, 7/1 (2014): 35–46.

Epistemically Virtuous Risk Management: Financial Due Diligence and Uncovering the Madoff Fraud, in Christoph Luetge and Christina Jauernig (eds.), Risk Management and Business Ethics (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 27–42.

Epistemische deugden en de wereldwijde financiële crisis, Filosofie en Praktijk, 34/4 (2013): 5–13.

The Epistemology of Religious Testimony, Philo, 16/1 (2013): 95–111.

Oaths and Codes in Economics and Business: Introducing the Special Issue (with Wilfred Dolfsma), Review of Social Economy, 71/2 (2013): 135–139.

Editorial Introduction: Putting Virtues Into Practice: A Challenge for Business and Organizations (with Joan Fontrodona and Alejo José G. Sison), Journal of Business Ethics, 113 (2013): 563–565.

Epistemic Virtues in Business, Journal of Business Ethics, 113 (2013): 583–595.

Epistemic Integrity in Accounting: Accountants as Justifiers in Joint Epistemic Agents, Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 32/1–2 (2013): 107–128.

Socially Responsible Investment in the Alcohol Industry: An Assessment of Investor Attitudes and Ethical Arguments, Contemporary Social Science, 8/1 (2013): 58–70, reprinted in Thom Brooks (ed.) Alcohol and Public Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 35–48.

The Liberal Value of Privacy, Law and Philosophy, 29/5 (2010): 505–534.

互动认识论 ‘Interactive Epistemology’ (translation by Jianhua Mei of Chapter 1, Explaining Games), in Guangyun Cheng and Nianxi Xia (eds.), Duoyuan: Volume of Analytic Philosophy (Shanghai: Joint Publishing, 2010), 336–360.

Over de wetenschappelijkheid van de rechtswetenschap, Rechtsfilosofie en Rechtstheorie 38/3, (2009): 236–243.

Doxastische en epistemische vrijheid, Tijdschrift voor filosofie 71/3 (2009): 529–552.

Liberal and Republican Freedom, Journal of Political Philosophy 17/4 (2009): 418–439.

We and the Plural Subject, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39/2 (2009): 235–259.

Overmathematisation in Game Theory: Pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme against the Epistemic Programme, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 40/3 (2009): 290–300.

The Logic of Valuing, in Thomas Boylan and Ruvin Gekker (eds.), Economics, Rational Choice and Normative Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2009), 164–172.

On the Narrow Epistemology of Game Theoretic Agents, in Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen and Tero Tulenheimo (eds.), Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 27–36.

On Glazer and Rubinstein on Persuasion, in Krzysztof R. Apt and Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interactions (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 141–150.

Media Violence and Freedom of Speech: How To Use Empirical Data, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 11/5 (2008): 493–505.

Wittgenstein on Circularity in the Frege-Russell Definition of Cardinal Number, Philosophia Mathematica 16/3 (2008): 354–373.

Common Knowledge of Rationality in Extensive Games, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 49/3 (2008): 261–280.

Common Knowledge of Payoff Uncertainty in Games, Synthese, 163/1 (2008): 79–97.

Bijsturen, of herzien?, Openbaar bestuur, 18/3 (2008): 36.

A Note on List’s Modal Logic of Republican Freedom, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 7/3 (2008): 341–349.

Reducible and Nonsensical Uses of Game Theory, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 38/2 (2008): 247–266.

Epistemic Logic and Epistemology, in Vincent F. Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 106–136.

Popper’s Conception of the Rationality Principle in the Social Sciences, in Ian Jarvie, Karl Milford and David Miller (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment: Selected Papers from Karl Popper 2002: Volume III: Science (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 207–215.

Game Theory in Philosophy, Topoi, 24/2 (2005): 197–208.

Afscheid van een Spinozaproject, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 94 (2002): 159–161.

Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics and the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, Proceedings of the International Wittgenstein Symposium 2001 (Kirchberg/Wechsel, 2001), 184–189.

Game Transformations and Game Equivalence, ILLC Technical Note X-1999-01, 1999.

Wittgenstein’s Objections Against the Frege-Russell Definition of Number, Proceedings of the International Wittgenstein Symposium 1999 (Kirchberg/Wechsel, 1999), 109–113.

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